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This paper proposes the introduction of a consumption-based corporate income tax in the 
European Union. Our proposal would guarantee neutrality regarding investment decisions and 
at the same time increase cost-efficiency. The proposal is based on the S-base cash flow tax, 
where transactions within the corporate sector are not at all taxable and only transactions be-
tween shareholders and corporations are subject to tax. In contrast to existing S-base cash 
flow tax systems, tax deductibility of investments is deferred. Rather, the acquisition costs 
and capital endowments are compounded at the capital market rate and are set off against fu-
ture capital gains. Dividends and withdrawals are fully taxable at the shareholder level. Be-
cause of the similarities to the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) tax our proposal is 
called Allowance for Shareholder Equity (ASE tax). 
The ASE tax exhibits the same neutrality properties as the traditional cash flow tax. More-
over, the compounded inter-temporal credit method ensures that it is neutral with respect to 
the decision between domestic and foreign investment. 
To increase acceptance of the ASE tax, current taxpayers’ documentation requirements will 
be reduced rather than extended. Our proposal is shaped in a way that it could be realized in a 
single EU country or in all member states of the EU. 
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Allowance for Shareholder Equity – Implementing a Neutral Corporate In-
come Tax in the European Union 
 
1  Introduction 
Current taxation in the European Union is characterized by a wide variety of different corpo-
rate tax systems. Due to the ongoing economic integration it is necessary to develop a tax sys-
tem that is consistent with the requirements of the Common Market and that does not dis-
criminate against cross-border activities. This fundamental problem goes back to the early 
years of the European Community. Since then, there have been many attempts to harmonize 
corporate taxation within Europe
1. Due to the trade-off between tax competition and national 
tax revenue considerations a harmonization of corporate taxes has not yet been realized. 
The most recent initiative for harmonizing corporate taxation in the EU started in 2001. The 
study “Corporate taxation in the internal market” measured the effective tax burden of intra-
state and cross-border activities. The study’s main conclusion was the proposal of a harmo-
nized tax base that should be allocated to the member states via formula apportionment
2. 
The introduction of formula apportionment intends to avoid the problems associated with 
transfer pricing, especially the shifting of tax bases to low-tax jurisdictions. Corporations have 
an incentive to shift expenditures to high-tax and revenues to low-tax countries. In the current 
system of separate taxation this effect can be easily reached by manipulating transfer prices. 
Since arm’s length transfer prices are notoriously hard to determine fiscal authorities tend to 
impose very tough documentation requirements on multinational groups. As a result, compli-
ance costs are high for taxpayers as well as for tax authorities. Introducing formula appor-
tionment would eliminate the need for transfer prices – at least for groups operating only 
within EU member states
3. However, intra-group transactions beyond the EU borders (“wa-
ter’s edge”) would still require transfer prices. Apart from the possible reduction of compli-
ance costs, the effects of formula apportionment on production and investment decisions as 
well as on the overall tax revenues are ambiguous
4. Canadian and U.S. experience with for-
mula apportionment is not very helpful because the tax rate differentials between EU member 
                                                 
1 See European Commission (2001), p. 16 ff. 
2 Four different reform proposals exist in order to harmonize tax bases in the EU. See European Commission 
(2001). Currently, different committees develop concepts for implementing the reform proposals. See European 
Commission (2004, 2005, 2006). For the international allocation of tax bases see Bird/Mintz (2003). 
3 See European Commission (2001). 
4 See Martini/Niemann/Simons (2007). 
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states exceed the ones between Canadian provinces or U.S. states substantially. 
Different corporate tax systems with varying tax accounting rules are not the only source of 
high compliance costs in Europe. Rather, the diversity of national financial accounting rules 
which are applied by non-listed companies
5 causes high compliance costs. This is especially 
evident in countries with two-book systems: For the individual financial statement, a quoted 
corporation may have to apply national GAAP. For the consolidated financial statement, IFRS 
are required. The corporate tax return has to be prepared in accordance with national tax ac-
counting rules. Summing up, repeated requests for tax simplification may reflect a level of 
compliance costs that is perceived unacceptable. 
Even more important than low compliance costs, neutrality is the crucial economic require-
ment of a “good” tax system, i.e., corporate tax systems should be neutral with respect to en-
trepreneurial decisions. However, even in an intra-state setting current corporate tax systems 
in Europe have considerable effects on investment and financing decisions
6. Taking cross-
border activities into account introduces a variety of additional tax effects. 
Neither the current tax systems nor the existing EU reform proposals are able to correct these 
economic shortcomings. Despite the current variety of corporate tax systems tax neutrality has 
not yet been reached in any of the member states. Elements of neutral taxation are imple-
mented in Norway, in Belgium, and in Estonia, but the neutral tax system in Croatia has been 
abolished in 2000. 
Despite the lack of practical implementation, economists’ knowledge about neutrality has 
grown over the years. Neutral tax systems in closed economies are well known for almost 60 
years now
7. Moreover, neutral tax systems under uncertainty have been developed exten-
sively in the past two decades
8. However, the environment of tax research and tax practice 
changed profoundly. Current problems of governments include three basic topics:  
                                                
•  Mobility of capital and cross-border taxation, 
•  Compliance costs of both taxpayers and tax authorities, 
 
5 In the EU, the IFRS are applied by publicly traded groups of corporations only. Some small countries including 
Malta did not develop national financial reporting standards. In those countries, IFRS-based reporting is applied 
by all companies. 
6 Typically, debt is tax-favoured over equity. Distributed profits are taxed more heavily than retained profits. 
Inter-temporal consumption is distorted by the taxation of interest income. For measuring distortions using neu-
trality-based effective tax rates see Knirsch (2007). 
7 The cash flow tax in its original form (R-base tax) was developed by Brown (1948). 
8 Neutral tax systems and their effects on investment decisions are described by Fane (1987), Devereux/Freeman 
(1991), Niemann (1999), Sureth (2002), Bond/Devereux (2003). 
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•  Developments in financial accounting and the relation of financial to tax accounting.  
There is extensive theoretical knowledge in these topics in different subdisciplines of public 
economics and accounting. However, practical implementation of tax reforms in most coun-
tries typically does not refer to theoretical insights in neither academic discipline. This paper 
addresses these problems and proposes a consumption-based neutral tax system which takes 
cross-border activities and transition problems into account. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 addresses the implementation 
of consumption-based corporate tax systems and explains the underlying principle of the Al-
lowance for Shareholder Equity (ASE tax). Section 3 discusses special features of the ASE 
tax for domestic investment. In section 4 we show how the ASE tax solves problems arising 
in a cross-border setting. Section 5 addresses the transition from current tax systems to the 
ASE tax. Section 6 concludes. 
2  Implementing consumption-based taxation 
2.1  Features of differing consumption-based tax systems 
Consumption-based tax systems are the most convenient method to reach tax neutrality. In 
contrast to a neutral comprehensive income tax (Johansson-Samuelson tax
9) a consumption-
based neutral tax system has already been implemented in practice: Croatia developed an Al-
lowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) in 1994
10. In 2000 the ACE tax was abolished for politi-
cal reasons despite a positive evaluation by the IMFF
                                                
11. The fact that an ACE tax is difficult to 
understand for some taxpayers might be considered as a disadvantage. Austrian experience 
with ACE tax elements confirmed that increasing complexity lowers political acceptance of 
tax reforms
12. Implementing a cash flow-based corporate income tax could mitigate this prob-
lem. 
There are different options for implementing cash flow taxes. All of the options are neutral 
with respect to investment and financing decisions
13. However, the versions differ with regard 
to compliance costs, vulnerability to misuse and revenue volatility
14. In light of these impor-
 
9 See Samuelson (1964), Johansson (1969). 
10 The ACE tax was originally developed by Wenger (1983) and Boadway/Bruce (1984). 
11 See Keen/King (2002). 
12 As an example, see § 11 Austrian income tax code. 
13 The different versions of the cash flow tax are described by Auerbach/Devereux/Simpson (2007), e.g. 
14 Becker/Fuest (2005) find that implementing a consumption tax would reduce tax revenues only slightly. 
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tant requirements the S-base tax
15 seems especially favourable. Under the S-base tax, income 
is not taxed on the corporate level. Rather, transactions between corporations and their share-
holders are taxable. In order to maintain the neutrality properties of the cash flow tax and to 
keep tax revenue constant during the transition process we propose a deferred S-base tax 
called Allowance for Shareholder Equity (ASE) which is described below
16. Abuse in form of 
tax refunds obtained by fraud as known from the R-base tax does not arise because tax reim-
bursements are avoided. In contrast to corporate tax systems, the ASE tax is not based on tax 
accounting at the corporate level. Only deposits by and distributions to shareholders have to 
be recognized. As a result, compliance costs on the corporate level can be reduced dramati-
cally. 
The dualism of coexistent tax bases is one of the main reasons for tax-induced distortions of 
investment and financing decisions. Dualism means that the tax base for labor income is de-
termined on a cash basis, whereas the tax base for capital income requires accrual accounting. 
Although the EU reform proposals fail to address this problem, abolishing dualism is a neces-
sary condition to reach neutrality. Since labor income is already computed on a cash basis this 
method should be transferred to capital income, too. Introducing a cash-based corporate in-
come tax removes dualism and replaces the current system by a uniform method to define the 
tax base. Computing the tax base of labor income would not require any reform. The same 
holds true for self-employed and for small enterprises who typically compute taxable income 
by using the cash method. 
Since a cash flow tax leaves interest income effectively tax-exempt its tax base is smaller 
compared to a comprehensive income tax. Thus, introducing a cash flow tax may require 
higher tax rates than a neutral comprehensive income tax if tax revenues are required to re-
main constant
17. Compared to real-world tax systems with incomplete taxation of capital in-
come, however, the tax rate increase would be rather small. 
2.2  The underlying principle of the deferred S-base tax 
Only transactions between a corporation and its shareholders are subject to the S-base tax. 
Transactions between the corporation and its customers, its suppliers, and its employees are 
                                                 
15 Named after the Meade report, the S-base tax is also called “Meade tax” or tax on net equity distribution base. 
See Meade et al. (1978); King (1987). Bond/Devereux (2003) prove that the S-base tax is neutral under uncer-
tainty. 
16 Kay/King (1978), p. 201, propose a compounded loss carry-forward for the transition to the cash flow tax. In 
Papua-New Guinea, a similar approach is used to tax economic rents from commodity-related investment pro-
jects. See Garnaut/Clunies (1983), p. 228 ff. 
17 On the other hand, a cash flow tax increases investment incentives which augments national tax revenue. 
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not taxable (see Figure 1). 








Figure 1: The tax base of the S-Base Tax. 
Under the traditional S-base tax known from the literature
18 capital raised by shareholders 
arouses immediate tax reimbursements. On the other hand, distributions like dividends are 
taxed immediately. This procedure ensures investment neutrality because the after-tax net 
present value of an investment project is always proportional to its pre-tax value. Since inter-
est income is effectively tax-exempt the S-base tax also guarantees inter-temporal consump-
tion neutrality. 
However, an S-base cash flow tax has not yet been implemented. Fiscal authorities have been 
aware of the abusive potential because they fear that tax reimbursements are obtained by 
fraud (analogous to VAT fraud) without ever generating positive operating cash flows. More-
over, a strong incentive to take advantage of international tax rate differentials exists: Inves-
tors could invest in high-tax countries and shift profits to low-tax countries. Similar problems 
will occur if investors emigrate or if corporations are bequeathed. 
This problem can be avoided if deposits do not qualify for an immediate tax relief. Rather, 
deposits by shareholders should be subject to an “Allowance for Shareholder Equity” (ASE) 
that can be subtracted from future distributions or realized capital gains. In present value 
terms this procedure is equivalent to the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) which was 
practiced in Croatia from 1994 until 2000
19. The underlying technique resembles the offset-
ting of a loss carry-forward, the only difference being the compounding of interest. 
At the time of providing the capital endowment, the investor’s tax due equals zero. When the 
capital is paid back to the investor the tax base TBt equals the difference of withdrawal
20 and 
accumulated capital endowment: 
                                                 
18 See Meade et al. (1978). 
19 See Schmidt/Wissel/Stöckler (1996), e.g. 
20 Our proposal is designed for corporations as well as partnerships and sole proprietors. For this reason, we do 
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Annual profits are not added to the equity account. 
For quoted corporations this procedure would be very expensive, because each distribution 
and each capital contribution would require a separate computation of the accumulated equity 
account for each investor. A less complex alternative would be the separation of current and 
final taxation. Current events like dividend payouts or withdrawals from partnerships would 
be fully taxable. Only infrequent or singular events like disinvestments or liquidations would 
be taxable taking deductibility of the accumulated equity account into consideration. This 
means that all payments to shareholders are fully taxable unless the shareholder can prove a 
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with TBt,current  tax base for current taxation 
 TBt,singular  tax base for final taxation 
Moreover, the separation of current and final taxation is reasonable to ensure a reliable tax 
collection. For current events a withholding tax should be levied prior to the individual tax 
assessment. In contrast, final taxation requires an individual tax assessment with a proof of 
the accumulated equity account. This procedure is consistent with tax practices in most coun-
tries and double taxation treaties. 
                                                 




Like other versions of the cash flow tax the ASE tax is neutral only for a proportional income 
tax rate
22. Whether a progressive tax rate or a proportional tax rate with high personal exemp-
tions is desirable from a distributional perspective has to be considered in the political proc-
ess. 
In a federal state local, regional, and federal taxes have to be co-ordinated
23. This is also true 
for the ASE tax. The neutrality property only holds if the tax bases on all levels are identical. 
This can be easily accomplished by a local or regional surcharge on the federal tax
24. 
2.3  Experiences with consumption-based tax systems in other countries  
Some countries have already implemented tax systems with some elements of this reform 
proposal. In the following we will describe these tax systems and use valuable experiences 
that help implementing and designing the details of the allowance for shareholder equity. 
First, these experiences give insights in retaining information concerning the acquisition costs 
of shares and in compounding these numbers as it is known from Norway
25. Second, in Pa-
pua-New Guinea
26 we can learn how to deal with an R-based cash flow tax. Third, some 
countries’ governments fix a riskless interest rate to calculate companies’ Allowance for Cor-
porate Equity (ACE). Croatia had implemented the ACE tax from 1994 to 2000. 
In Norway, the well-known dual income tax
27 has been modified
28 as from January 1
st 2006 
in order to implement a neutral taxation of ‘active’ shareholders. Corporate income taxes will 
be paid on the corporate level. In case of profit distributions shareholders will pay dividend 
taxes only if the distributions exceed the ‘Rate-of-Return Allowance’, an imputed interest of 
the equity. In case of retained profits, the active shareholder does not lose the allowance: The 
amount will be carried forward on an annual basis and accumulated over time. This tax sys-
tem differs from our tax reform proposal. Nevertheless, we can learn from Norway that it is 
possible to handle storage and to carry shareholder information forward. 
Almost unnoticed in the international literature, a neutral R-based
29 cash flow tax is in effect 
                                                 
22 It can be proved that the cash flow tax violates neutrality under time-dependent tax rates. See Niemann 
(2004a), p. 278 f. 
23 For the benefits and problems of fiscal decentralization see Wellisch (2000). 
24 Municipal surcharges as a percentage of cantonal taxes are levied in Switzerland, e.g. 
25 See Sørensen (2005b). 
26 See Garnaut/Clunies (1983), p. 228 ff. 
27 See Sørensen (1994); Sørensen (2005a), e.g. 
28 See International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (Ed.) (2006), p. 495. 
29 The ASE tax is an S-based cash flow tax. In contrast to the R-based tax, the S-based cash flow tax inherits the 
advantage that no special tax rules are needed for financial institutions; see Meade et al. (1978), p. 240; Sinn 
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in Papua-New Guinea since the 1970s. In the mining sector, initial investment costs are typi-
cally very high. There is an immediate write-off of these initial acquisition costs, causing a 
loss carry-forward. The loss carry-forward is compounded over time. It is reduced by cash 
inflows. Thus, taxes are effectively paid on a cash flow basis. As in our reform proposal of the 
ASE tax, a compounded loss carry-forward replaces the immediate tax refund in case of 
losses. 
In Croatia, an ACE tax had been implemented from 1994 until 2000. Profits were reduced by 
an imputed interest rate on equity. The imputation rate was defined by the government and 
included both an interest and inflation rate. Summing up, the two components were necessary 
because a developed capital market was missing throughout the post-communism and post-
war transition years. This task would have to be carried out differently in Europe nowadays, 
because we can use long-term interest rates paid at the capital market.  
A very innovative tax system has been implemented in Estonia in recent years: As in our ASE 
tax proposal, shareholders instead of corporations are taxed. Retained profits are tax-
exempt
30, while distributed profits are taxed at 23%. Contrary to the ASE tax, acquisition 
costs are not compounded. Thus, the tax system does not reach neutrality. Nevertheless, Esto-
nia’s tax system is a large progress in respect of simplifying the tax base and reducing com-
pliance costs. 
3  Taxation of domestic businesses 
3.1  Corporations 
As mentioned above, the ASE tax separates current dividends and infrequent events like share 
disposals or liquidation proceeds. Deduction of compounded acquisition costs only takes 
place in case of selling shares or liquidation of the corporation. The taxable capital gain is 
calculated by subtracting the compounded acquisition costs from the liquidation proceeds. 
This gain is fully taxed, regardless of the fraction and duration of ownership. Due to coordi-
nated dividend and capital gains taxation, tax avoidance is not possible whether the corpora-
tions retain or distribute profits. The following example highlights this advantage. 
                                                                                                                                                          
(1987), p. 15 f.; Bond/Devereux (2003) 




Figure 2: Assumptions and equity account for taxing corporations.  
Assume an investor who buys shares for € 10,000. After one year he receives € 500 dividends. 
After another year he sells the shares for € 13,000. The interest rate for calculating the allow-
ance is fixed by the government at 4% which corresponds to the capital market rate. The in-
come tax rate is proportional and amounts to 40%.  




−+ + = €. 
For calculating the net present value after taxes, the acquisition costs of € 10,000 are stored, 
compounded, and carried forward; no taxes are due. After one year, the shareholder receives 
the dividend and pays 0 € income tax. At year 2, the capital gain from selling the 
shares is derived by subtracting the compounded acquisition costs from the liquidation 
proceeds:  €. The income tax is 0
,4 500 200 ⋅=
2 000 1,04 2, −⋅ = 13,000 10, 184 ,4 2,184 873.60 ⋅ = €. In total, 








+ = −+ €. This 
is equal to the net present value before taxes, reduced by the tax rate: 
€.  2,500 (1 0.4) 1,500 ⋅− =
A similar net present value will be realized if the corporation does not pay dividends. Instead, 
the profit is reinvested in the corporation at the capital market rate. The liquidation proceeds 
increase at the amount of the compounded capital market investment to € 13,520. The after-
tax net present value is 
NPVτ= ( )
2
                                                
2
500 1,04 13,000 0,4 13,520 10,000 1,04
10,000 1,500
1, 04
⋅+ − ⋅ − ⋅
−+ = €. This example 
shows that, assuming a finite time horizon of the investor, the ASE does not affect profit dis-
tribution policy and does therefore not induce a ‘lock-in effect’
31. 
All kinds of transactions within a group of companies are not taxable. For example, financing 
subsidiaries or distributing profits to a parent corporation is not taxed. Only the last link of the 
 
31 Classical corporate tax systems as known in many countries induce a ‘lock-in effect‘. 
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chain, the shareholders’ transactions with the parent corporation, are taxed as described 
above. 
3.2  Partnerships and sole proprietorships 
Partnerships and sole proprietorships can also be taxed according to the ASE tax. Investments 
in the partnership will increase the equity account as it is well-known for taxing partnerships 
applying the accrual method of accounting. In contrast to typical tax systems, the equity ac-
count is compounded annually. Withdrawals or sale of the business are fully taxable. In case 
of selling the business, the capital gain is derived by subtracting the compounded investments 
from the liquidation proceeds
32. Thus, the ASE tax guarantees that partnerships and sole pro-
prietorships are taxed exactly like corporations and the choice of legal form is independent of 
taxes. 
3.3  Debt financing 
We have shown that the choice concerning the legal form of a business as well as a compa-
ny’s distribution policy is unaffected by the ASE tax. Another important aim, well-known in 
the finance literature
33, is that the choice between equity and debt financing should be unaf-
fected by taxes. In most countries, this aim is not fulfilled. Instead debt financing is very often 
taxed preferentially compared to equity financing. This causes an incentive to replace equity 
by debt and treasuries try to restrict this behavior by implementing thin capitalization rules
34. 
A cash flow tax system’s feature is tax-exemption of interest earned and no tax-deductibility 
of interest paid as long as the interest rate corresponds to the capital market interest rate. In 
case of debt financed by shareholders at a higher interest rate, the ASE tax aims at taxing the 
debt equal to equity: The part of the interest payment exceeding the capital market interest 
rate is fully taxable, while the adequate part is tax-exempt. 
To achieve this goal, obtaining a shareholder loan increases the shareholder’s equity account 
exactly as in case of equity, while interest payments and current amortizations are fully taxa-
ble and do not affect the equity account. High amortization rates decrease the equity account 
and are tax-exempt to this amount. In case of a shareholder loan yielding at the capital market 
interest rate, the loan is not taxed at all as known from all cash flow tax systems.  
                                                 
32 In case of very high withdrawals, taxation could take place as in case of sales. Then only withdrawals exceed-
ing the compounded equity account would be taxed. Afterwards, the equity account has to be reduced by the 
withdrawn amount.  
33 See, e.g., the seminal paper by Modigliani/Miller (1958). 
34 See, e.g., § 4h German individual income tax code, § 8a German corporate income tax code. 
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Loans between companies remain tax-exempt. This is comparable to all other kinds of trans-
actions between businesses as long as no personal investor is involved. The present value of 
tax payments on the capital market interest rate is always zero. This holds for both sharehold-
er’s and financial institution’s loans. Only interest payments exceeding the capital market rate 
are fully taxable. 
Thus, the ASE tax provides a solution for avoiding excessive debt financing. Complex thin 
capitalization rules can be abolished. The present value of tax payments is always the same, 
independent of declaring distributions as dividends, withdrawals, interest payment or wage 
and salary. 
4  Taxation of cross-border activities 
The ASE tax is a tax at the shareholder level. As a consequence, the international tax alloca-
tion is based on the shareholders’ residence which realizes the concept of capital export neu-
trality. A world-wide implementation of capital export neutrality would guarantee production 
efficiency
35. A consistent implementation of the ASE tax could therefore overcome the arbi-
trary mixture of capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality inherent in the current 
taxation of cross-border activities
36. 
4.1  Structures of cross-border activities 
In the following we will describe how the ASE tax is levied on cross-border investments. We 
distinguish between domestic and foreign shareholders, corporations, and groups of compa-
nies which operate cross-border.  
4.1.1  Domestic shareholder, foreign corporation 
For domestic shareholders it makes no difference in which country their corporation is lo-
cated. Capital gains are taxed in the shareholder’s country of residence
37. According to the 
OECD model tax convention, dividends can be taxed in the source country up to a limited rate 
which can be credited against the shareholder’s domestic income tax liability. If the foreign 
withholding tax on dividends exceeds the shareholder’s individual tax rate the shareholder is 
in an excess credit position
38. Under the ASE tax excess credits are converted into a credit 
claim which is compounded at the capital market rate
39 and can be credited as soon as the 
                                                 
35 See Frenkel/Razin/Sadka (1991); Homburg (1999), p. 4. 
36 For a discussion of capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality see Mintz/Tulkens (1996). 
37 See Art. 13 para. 5 OECD model tax convention. 
38 See Scholes et al. (2005), p. 317 ff., e.g. 
39 An example for the inter-temporal compounded credit method is given in the appendix. 
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shareholder is in an excess limitation position. Hence, a tax reimbursement cannot occur. 
Our proposal is intended to minimize the costs of transition to the ASE tax. Thus, we take the 
existing double taxation treaties and their allocation of tax revenues as given. Most double 
taxation treaties between industrialized countries refer to the OECD model tax convention 
with its typical withholding tax rate for dividends on widely held stock of 15%
40. Due to the 
compounded inter-temporal credit method no shareholder will be worse off than under current 
law. 
Repatriations by foreign branches have to be taxed in accordance with dividends from foreign 
corporations. Repatriations to a domestic business property are not taxable, because repatria-
tions are not equivalent to withdrawals. Only direct repatriations to private property are tax-
able in the shareholders’ country of residence
41. If the foreign country taxes foreign branch 
profits (which is the typical case in Europe), foreign source taxes will be credited against do-
mestic tax liabilities upon withdrawal from the domestic business property. Possible excess 
credits are converted in a credit claim which is compounded at the capital market rate. 
Capital gains from selling foreign corporations are taxed like domestic capital gains. Hence, 
shareholders have to prove the accumulated acquisition costs. Typically, there is no foreign 
withholding tax on capital gains. However, if the foreign country levies a withholding tax on 
capital gains it will be credited against domestic income tax liabilities, possibly compounded 
in later periods. 
4.1.2  Foreign shareholder, domestic corporation 
Since the ASE tax is levied at the shareholder level, domestic corporations are not taxed. This 
is valid for domestic subsidiaries owned by foreign shareholders as well as for domestic 
branches of a foreign parent company. Repatriations are taxed upon withdrawal from a do-
mestic business property by a natural person. 
Dividends from domestic corporations are subject to a withholding tax
42 independent of the 
shareholders’ country of residence. If the withholding tax can be credited against the foreign 
income tax will depend on foreign tax law. In the system of the ASE tax, there is no need to 
impose a withholding tax on capital gains
43. 
                                                 
40 See Art. 10 para. 2 lit. b) OECD model tax convention. 
41 This should be a rare case. 
42 As under current law, the difference between the actual source tax rate and the tax rate mentioned in the dou-
ble taxation treaty must be refunded to the foreign shareholder upon request. 
43 See Art. 13 para. 5 OECD model tax convention. 
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Since the ASE tax does not tax profits at the corporate level, foreign shareholders have an 
incentive to realize profits in domestic branches instead of domestic subsidiaries. In case of a 
double taxation treaty that exempts foreign branch profits, foreign investors could reach a 
double non-taxation of domestic profits by non-taxation of branch profits in accordance with 
the ASE tax and non-taxation of repatriations in accordance with the double taxation treaty. 
To avoid this misuse of the ASE tax it is necessary to align the taxation of branches and sub-
sidiaries: Repatriations from domestic branches to foreign natural persons qualify as divi-
dends and are subject to a domestic withholding tax. Technically, this procedure is equivalent 
to the U.S. “branch profits tax”
44 which also intends to implement an equal tax treatment of 
branches and subsidiaries. In the shareholder’s country of residence the domestic branch prof-
its tax has to be credited against the individual income tax. 
As all domestic enterprises are subject to a withholding tax on dividends or branch distribu-
tions regardless of the shareholder’s country of residence, there is no discrimination of foreign 
investors. Thus, the ASE tax does not violate European law. 
4.1.3  Foreign parent company, domestic subsidiary 
The ASE tax exempts all transactions within business property. This is also valid for transac-
tions within corporate groups. According to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive
45, intra-group 
dividends in the EU are already exempted from withholding taxes, which is compatible with 
the ASE tax, too. Double taxation treaties typically permit a withholding tax of 5% or 15% on 
dividends paid to non-EU countries or to non-qualified shareholders, depending on the equity 
stake. Source taxation of intra-business dividends contradicts the principle of the ASE tax. It 
could at best be justified for reasons of reciprocity or to limit transition costs. 
Repatriations of domestic branches to foreign parent companies should be subject to the same 
branch profits tax rate as intra-group dividends of domestic subsidiaries (0%, 5%, or 15%, 
depending on the parent company’s country of residence and stake of the shareholder). Since 
the ASE tax is strictly based on capital export neutrality, shifts of tax revenue compared to the 
current status are possible. Thus, a co-ordinated implementation of the ASE tax seems prefer-
able, although a unilateral implementation would be technically possible. 
                                                 
44 See Sec. 884 IRC (U.S. Internal Revenue Code). 
45 Parent-Subsidiary-Directive: Council Directive of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable 
in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States (90/435/EEC), OJ 1990, L 225/6-9, 
amended in OJ 1990, L 266/20. Changed by Directive 2003/123/EC of 22.12.2003, OJ 2004, L 7/41-44. 
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4.1.4  Domestic parent company, foreign subsidiary 
According to current double taxation treaties, intra-group dividends may be subject to a with-
holding tax. Under the ASE tax, however, intra-group transactions are tax-exempt. If foreign 
withholding taxes are still levied on intra-group dividends they have to be credited indirectly 
against the parent company’s shareholders’ individual income tax liabilities as soon as the 
parent company pays out dividends
46. If the parent company currently does not pay dividends 
the intra-group withholding taxes have to be converted into a credit claim which is com-
pounded at the capital market rate and can be credited against the shareholders’ income tax 
later. 
Intra-group capital gains are not taxable under the ASE tax. This corresponds to current cor-
porate tax practice and double taxation treaties in many countries. Foreign branches of domes-
tic parent companies have to be taxed in accordance with the treatment of foreign subsidiaries. 
According to many double taxation treaties foreign branch profits are tax-exempt in the coun-
try of residence and only taxable in the source country
47. If the ASE tax is implemented in the 
entire EU double taxation will be avoided. As under current law, activities in non-EU coun-
tries, however, may be subject to double taxation unless a cross-border imputation system is 
implemented. Apart from the inter-temporal credit method the transition to the ASE tax does 
not pose any novel technical problems. 
4.2  Further topics in cross-border taxation 
4.2.1  Expatriation taxation 
Since the ASE tax does not tax profits at the corporate level relocating a corporation has no 
direct tax consequences under the ASE tax. In contrast, if a natural person moves to a new 
country of residence, the former country of residence will lose its right to tax future capital 
gains which have been accumulated during the time of residence. For a proper international 
tax allocation virtual capital gains taxation has to be carried out when the taxpayer leaves the 
country of residence. The ASE tax also requires this procedure already known from current 
tax systems. To ensure freedom of establishment within the EU, however, the virtual capital 
gains tax must not be levied when taxpayers move within the EU. Instead the tax will be de-
ferred until the assets under consideration are actually being sold or if the taxpayer moves to a 
non-EU country. 
                                                 
46 The indirect credit method corresponds to a corporate imputation tax system. 
47 See Art. 7 para. 1 in combination with Art. 23A OECD model tax convention. 
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4.2.2  CFC legislation 
Controlled foreign corporations (CFC) legislation is practiced in some countries in order to 
prevent taxpayers in high-tax countries from using tax shelters for passive income in low-tax 
countries. Under the ASE tax it is not necessary to establish a CFC legislation, because non-
taxation at the corporate level is not a loophole, but an integral part of this tax system. In a 
consumption-based income tax interest income is tax-exempt in any case, so there is no need 
to shift interest income to tax shelters. Hence, CFC legislation has to be abolished under the 
ASE tax. This leads to a further reduction in tax compliance costs. 
4.2.3  Transfer pricing 
Determination and documentation of transfer prices is a vast problem in international taxation 
which induces high tax planning and tax compliance costs
48 for taxpayers as well as for fiscal 
authorities. Since the ASE tax refrains from taxing income at the corporate level, the incentive 
to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions by means of transfer pricing is reduced dramatically. If 
all countries implemented the ASE tax there would be no need at all for transfer prices, be-
cause only the shareholders’ country of residence would receive tax revenue. 
However, a world-wide implementation of the ASE tax is unlikely. As our proposal is in-
tended to minimize transition costs we take the existing double taxation treaties as given. For 
non-European countries opting out of the ASE tax, transfer pricing still matters for the distri-
bution of withholding taxes on dividends (0%/5%/15%, e.g.). Hence, arm’s length transfer 
prices according to Art. 9 OECD model tax convention are still required. In case of intra-EU 
companies, there are no taxes levied on dividends and therefore no transfer price documenta-
tion is necessary. In any case, the relevant tax rate differentials and the incentives for profit 
shifting decrease substantially compared to the status quo. 
Any country introducing the ASE tax can improve its competitive position considerably. 
Compared to the present tax competition the intensity of tax competition which can be ex-
pected between ASE tax countries and non-ASE tax countries will increase. As a conse-
quence, ASE tax countries will be able to shift tax compliance costs associated with transfer 
pricing documentation to non-ASE tax countries which can be regarded as a recommendation 
to join the ASE tax area. 
                                                 
48 For transfer pricing documentation requirements see Ernst & Young (2006). 
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4.2.4  Hidden distributions 
The current tax system potentially provides incentives for hidden distributions because ex-
penditures can be deductible at the corporate level whereas receipts may or may not be tax-
able at the individual level. The ASE tax abolishes these incentives because there is no taxa-
tion at the corporate level and hence no deductibility of corporate expenditures. As a result, 
hidden distributions from domestic corporations to domestic or foreign shareholders are non-
deductible. Hidden distributions from foreign corporations to domestic shareholders are taxed 
like ordinary dividends: All compensations received by domestic shareholders are fully tax-
able, regardless whether they are labelled as dividends, royalties, interest, or salary. This im-
plies that all payments from business property to private property are subject to individual 
income tax. 
4.2.5  Formula apportionment 
Tax base competition between member states is regarded undesirable by the European Com-
mission. Thus, the current corporate tax reform proposals are intended to harmonize the tax 
base which should be allocated to the member states in accordance with a pre-defined appor-
tionment formula
49. Formula apportionment is supposed to eliminate the transfer pricing 
problems arising under separate accounting. However, introducing formula apportionment 
requires approval of all EU member states. In light of the well-known problems of formula 
apportionment
50 the EU-wide introduction is unlikely. 
                                                
In contrast, the ASE tax eliminates the deficiencies of current corporate taxation in the EU 
and simultaneously avoids the problems of formula apportionment: 
•  As shown above, the ASE tax does not require the determination of arm’s length transfer 
prices. 
•  Formula apportionment still requires tax accounting at the corporate level and induces 
higher tax compliance costs whereas the ASE tax levies no tax at all at the corporate level, 
thus making tax accounting systems unnecessary. 
•  Formula apportionment generates large incentives to shift the tax base by changing eco-
nomic decisions instead of just using accounting options. 
 
49 For a description of formula apportionment see Martens-Weiner (2006), p. 33 ff. 
50 See Martini/Niemann/Simons (2007). 
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•  Assuming that the choice of residence of natural persons is inelastic with respect to tax 
rates, persisting tax rate differentials within the EU cannot be expected to induce substan-
tial incentives for relocation. 
4.2.6  Group taxation 
Non-harmonized tax bases in different jurisdictions complicate cross-border group taxation 
substantially. Under current tax law in some EU member states, losses of foreign subsidiaries 
may be offset by domestic parent companies by applying domestic tax accounting rules. 
Complicated rules for subsequent taxation are required to prevent a “double dip”, i.e., a loss-
offset by both the subsidiary and the parent company
51. Due to non-taxation at the corporate 
level, these problems do not occur under the ASE tax. 
The Marks & Spencer verdict by the European Court of Justice
52 basically requires that final 
losses of foreign subsidiaries must be set off against domestic profits. The ASE tax complies 
with this requirement, because capital losses from liquidating (domestic or foreign) corpora-
tions are assigned to the shareholders. Therefore, complicated group accounting rules are dis-
pensable under the ASE tax. 
4.2.7  Thin capitalization rules 
Thin capitalization rules are frequently applied in high-tax jurisdictions to prevent excessive 
intra-group borrowing that would lead to a drain of tax revenue. The ASE tax is neutral with 
respect to financing decisions. At the corporate level, financing costs are non-deductible, re-
gardless of the source of finance. Hence, there is no incentive for excessive borrowing. 
For domestic shareholders interest income is tax-exempt up to the capital market rate, regard-
less of providing equity or loans. For foreign shareholders the optimal source of finance de-
pends on the tax system in the country of residence. If the foreign country of residence also 
introduces the ASE tax financing neutrality is guaranteed even in the cross-border context. 
5  Transition from the current tax system to the ASE tax 
5.1  Introduction 
As the tax bases under current tax systems and the ASE tax differ substantially, the transition 
                                                 
51 For the investment effects of the Austrian group taxation see Niemann/Treisch (2005). 




from the old to the new system has to be planned carefully. To ensure that all profits are taxed 
exactly once in the overall period, double taxation as well as double non-taxation has to be 
avoided
53. The ASE tax permits a very easy-to-handle transition: Instead of recording data for 
every profit and loss account position the taxpayer has to calculate the correct equity account 
at the transition date. This reduces paperwork and tax compliance costs considerably. 
The opening equity account of partners and sole proprietors equals the one known under 
common accrual methods of accounting tax systems. Adaptations are not necessary, the only 
difference is that the equity account needs to be compounded after the implementation of the 
ASE tax. This is different for corporations. In these cases, the acquisition costs of the shares 
represent the opening balance of the equity account
54. 
5.2  Existing loss carry-forwards 
Loss offset restrictions are a typical element of all existent corporate and personal income tax 
systems. Existing loss carry-forwards have to be taken into account at the transition to the 
neutral tax system, because ignoring them would be an implicit expropriation of taxpayers. 
Profits and losses of partners and sole proprietors belong to the personal level of the owner. 
Existing loss carry-forwards can be kept without adjustments
55. To maintain the neutrality 
properties of the ASE tax, the loss carry-forwards have to be compounded annually. The ori-
gin of the loss (negative capital gain, negative self-employed income, negative business in-
come) is irrelevant. Positive income will only be taxed if it exceeds the compounded loss car-
ry-forward. This method guarantees a present value of tax payments equal to the present value 
that would result in case of a full immediate tax refund. Nevertheless, the treasury has the 
advantage of lower tax revenue volatility. 
Transition rules are more complex in case of corporations. Corporate losses are attributed to 
the corporations, not to their owners. As the ASE tax does not include levying a tax on the 
corporate level, corporate loss carry-forwards are worthless. To keep the value of current car-
ry-forwards, they have to be attributed to the owners of the shares where they can be offset 
                                                 
53 These kinds of transition problems already exist in countries with parallel tax base definitions. In Germany, 
small companies can choose between the accrual method of accounting and the cash method of accounting. 
When switching between those systems, the taxpayer has to follow special rules to guarantee a smooth transition 
(see R 17 German income tax directive). Proposals for transition rules are given by King (1987), p. 390 ff. 
54 In some countries, capital gains taxation depends on the holding period of the shares. For example, in Germa-
ny capital gains will be tax-exempt if the shares are held for more than 1 year and the stake in the corporation is 
less than 1%. In those cases, grandfathering rules have to be implemented to assure tax-exemption of capital 
gains after the transition. For more details concerning taxation of capital gains in Germany, Austria and Switzer-
land see Schanz/Knirsch/Bauer (2007).  
55 Niemann (2004b) analyzes loss offset restrictions in a cross-border setting. 
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against future earnings. This is realized by adding the value of the loss carry-forwards to the 
shareholders’ equity accounts. Thus, a future capital gain is reduced due to higher deductible 
acquisition costs of the shares. Income at the amount of the compounded loss carry-forward 
remains tax-exempt, because the equity account is compounded over time. Thus, compound-
ing the loss carry-forwards is assured, comparable to those resulting in partnerships and sole 
proprietorships. 
6   Conclusion  
In this paper, we introduce the deferred Allowance for Shareholder Equity tax. This tax sys-
tem comprises taxation of business profits independent of the legal form of the business. 
Thus, it is possible to tax corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships according to one 
single tax system. The ASE tax is neutral with respect to investment decisions. The main fea-
ture of the Allowance for Shareholder Equity is that business profits remain tax-exempt as 
long as they are not distributed to shareholders or business owners.  
As distributions are taxed according to the tax system in the country of residence of the share-
holders, problems of profit shifting or investment shifting to other low-tax countries are elim-
inated. These incentives do exist in current corporate tax systems, especially in European 
countries. Under an ASE tax, taxation does not depend on the source country and does not 
depend on the form of repatriations, be it interest payments, dividends, or capital gains. For-
eign withholding taxes can be credited against the domestic tax liability. In case of an excess 
credit situation an annually compounding credit claim is introduced. This credit claim can be 
set off against future domestic tax liabilities. If the ASE tax was implemented in a EU mem-
ber state, withholding taxes would be zero according to the Parent-Subsidiary-Directive.  
As a consequence, profit shifting incentives are eliminated and fiscal authorities can remove 
costly transfer pricing documentation requirements. Thus, complicated and distorting formula 
apportionment rules and harmonized tax accounting rules as currently discussed by the Euro-
pean Commission are unnecessary. Another important simplification compared to current tax 
law is the dispensability of a national tax accounting system. As profits are not calculated, 
there is no need for an accrual tax accounting system. 
The ASE tax is neutral with respect to investment and financing decisions and to the choice of 
the legal form of the business. Equity and debt financing are equally taxed; current thin capi-
talization rules can be abolished. Many other problems arising under current tax systems in 
cross-border settings are solved by the ASE tax. 
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An advantage of the ASE tax over the well-known Scandinavian dual income tax (DIT) is 
equal tax treatment of all kinds of income. Thus, splitting small businesses’ income into labor 
income and capital income is unnecessary. 
At first sight, there seems to be a lock-in effect in the ASE tax because retained profits are not 
subject to tax. But this effect only appears under a short-term view. In the overall period, the 
after-tax net present value remains unaffected by the time of distributing profits and paying 
taxes; therefore no lock-in effect occurs.  
In the literature we find different analyzes showing that implementing a cash flow tax arouses 
only small tax revenue decreases
56. Business profits and interest income up to the level of the 
capital market rate remain tax-exempt, but the exceeding income is fully taxable. The revenue 
decrease would even be smaller under the ASE tax, because no tax refunds are granted when 
investments take place. Keeping equity account records restricts tax revenue volatility, while 
compounding the accounts guarantees neutrality of the tax system. Thus, the disadvantage of 
a possible abuse of a cash-based tax system can be avoided. 
EU member states opting in favor of the ASE tax would gain a substantial competitive edge 
over non-ASE countries and would create massive incentives to invest from abroad. 
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Appendix: Compounded inter-temporal credit method 
In most countries including Germany
57 and Austria
58 the credit method only refers to the tax 
period under consideration and does not permit inter-temporal tax credits. If foreign source 
taxes cannot be credited against domestic income taxes due to losses, e.g., the excess credit is 
lost and cannot be used in subsequent tax periods. Instead of the credit method, some coun-
tries permit the deduction of foreign taxes
59 in order to mitigate double taxation. However, 
deduction only provides partial relief of double taxation. 
As a result, an equal tax treatment of domestic and foreign investments requires the integra-
tion of ASE elements in the credit method. Current crediting methods have to be replaced by a 
compounded inter-temporal credit method. As soon as taxpayers face a positive domestic tax 
liability, it has to be offset against the inter-temporal credit claim. The deduction method is 
not required any more. Abolishing the choice between credit and deduction would dramati-
cally reduce the complexity of tax planning for international investment
60. 
The following example shows the effects of the compounded inter-temporal credit method. In 
period t=1 a foreign subsidiary pays a dividend of 100,000 € to a domestic natural person. We 
assume that the domestic person has an exogenously-given loss carry-forward of 230,000 € 
from past activities. Labor income amounts to 50,000  € annually. Due to the loss carry-
forward foreign withholding tax on dividends (assumed to be 5%) cannot be credited against 
domestic income taxes. According to current tax law in many countries the claim to credit the 
foreign withholding tax would be lost because it cannot be carried forward to subsequent pe-
riods. 
Assuming a compounded inter-temporal credit method the credit claim would grow at the 
capital market rate (assumed to be i=10%) to 5,500 € in period t=2. Due to a remaining loss 
carry-forward it is not possible to use the credit claim in period t=2. Only in t=3 and t=4 the 
credit claim can be fully offset against domestic income tax liabilities. 
 
 
                                                 
57 See § 34c para. 1 German income tax code. 
58 See the Austrian directive for avoidance of international double taxation 
59 See § 34c para. 3 German income tax code. 






t  123   4
Dividendt (fully taxable)  100,000 0 0  0
Foreign withholding taxt (5%)  5,000 0 0  0
Labor incomet 50,000 50,000 50,000  50,000
Sum of earningst 150,000 50,000 50,000  50,000
Taxable incomet 0 0 20,000  50,000
Crediting the foreign withholding tax 
Domestic income taxt (20%)  0 0 4,000  10,000
Credit claimt (see below)  5,000 5,500 6,050  2,255
Maximum amount to be creditedt 0 0 4,000  2,255
Determining the compounded credit claim 
Initial valuet 0 5,000 5,500  2,050
Excess creditst 5,000 0 0  0
Compoundingt (10%)  0 500 550  205
Current amount to be creditedt   0 0 4,000  2,255
Terminal valuet 5,000 5,500 2,050  0
Loss carry-forward 
Initial valuet 230,000 80,000 30,000  0
Currrent loss offsett 150,000 50,000 30,000  0
Terminal valuet 80,000 30,000 0  0
As a result, the present value of the current amounts to be credited exactly equals the foreign 




                                                
. 
Although there are countries which practice an inter-temporal credit method
61, only the com-
pounded inter-temporal credit method ensures equal taxation of domestic and foreign invest-
ment projects. 
 
61 In the U.S., Sec. 904 (c) IRC permits carry-backs und carry-forwards of excess credits. However, compound-
ing excess credits is not granted.  
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